The security of the BLT signature scheme with practical implementation issues

Authors

  • Trieu Quang Phong Institute of Cryptography Science and Technology
  • Vo Tung Linh

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54654/isj.v2i14.146

Keywords:

Lược đồ chữ ký BLT, hạ tầng KSI, giả mạo tồn tại, tính chống chối bỏ, cây băm Merkle. the BLT signature scheme, KSI infrastructure, non-repudiation, Merkle tree.

Tóm tắt

Abstract— KSI infrastructure is a time-stamping and server-based signature solution deployed in Estonia to provide the integrity and timing information of data. With the goal of providing a personal signature that does not depend on the long-term secrecy of signing keys, Buldas et al. have proposed a BLT scheme that is based on the KSI infrastructure. Although Buldas et al. have shown that the (modified) BLT scheme is secure in the theoretical model, the fact that its practical implementation does not follow that description. In this paper, we will evaluate and provide two attack scenarios if the BLT schema is implemented in such a way, and then propose a solution to that problem.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Downloads

Abstract views: 102 / PDF downloads: 43

Published

2022-01-14

How to Cite

Phong, T. Q., & Linh, V. T. (2022). The security of the BLT signature scheme with practical implementation issues. Journal of Science and Technology on Information Security, 2(14), 35-44. https://doi.org/10.54654/isj.v2i14.146

Issue

Section

Papers